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Surveying the Safety Culture of 
Academic Laboratories
By Emily Faulconer, Zachary Dixon, John C. Griffith, and Hayden Frank
The university traditionally has 
been the foundation for young 
adults’ professional development, 
yet the proclivity toward safety 
culture has garnered less focus 
in higher education than in the 
workforce. A survey of faculty at 
a medium-sized, research-active, 
private institution revealed specific 
areas of policy noncompliance as 
well as specific safety attitudes that 
can be targeted for interventions.  
Albeit a snapshot view, the survey 
implies that safety needs better 
representation in the classroom, 
teaching laboratories, and research 
facilities at universities. Safety 
is not abandoned by any means, 
and there is a strong presence of 
safety-oriented individuals, but 
the data show barriers to safety 
do exist that need to be addressed. 
The implications of this small-
scale study serve as a foundation 
for a more comprehensive multi-
institutional study in the future.
Many universities of-fer laboratory courses in support of science lecture courses. A lab-
oratory experience offers the op-
portunity for students to interact 
with and manipulate instruments 
and materials in order to explore 
scientific theories. The National 
Research Council emphasizes the 
importance of maintaining student 
safety in laboratory settings (NRC, 
2014). The U.S. Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Act (OSHA) governs 
workplace health and safety. Within 
this act, safety in a laboratory set-
ting is addressed through the Haz-
ard Communication Standard, the 
Laboratory Standard, and the Gen-
eral Duty Clause. These standards 
do not cover public sector workers 
or nonemployees such as students 
in a teaching laboratory (Stroud 
& Roy, 2009), though many states 
have OSHA-approved state plans 
that do cover public sector work-
ers. Some states have safety statutes 
that are applicable to nonemployees 
such as students in academic labs. 
While many institutions adopted 
the Lab Standard for employees and 
students, it often replaced safety 
education for students to the detri-
ment of both safety competency and 
safety ethics (Hill, 2012). Academ-
ic laboratory safety programs can 
benefit from adopting federal and 
industry safety standards such as 
those in the OSHA Process Safety 
Standard and the NIOSH Pocket 
Guide (Barsan, 2007; Langerman, 
2009). Professional organizations 
also offer key resources, including 
the American Chemical Society’s 
report “Creating Safety Cultures 
in Academic Institutions,” the Na-
tional Research Council’s Prudent 
Practices in the Laboratory: Han-
dling and Management of Chemical 
Hazards, and the National Science 
Teaching Association’s Safety Blog 
and Safety Issue Papers (Hill, 2012; 
NRC, 2011; NSTA, 2020). 
Despite these guidelines, acci-
dents do happen in higher education 
teaching and research laboratories. 
Many accidents are relatively minor. 
In a 2018 study, the most prevalent 
category of compensable accidents 
were cuts, lacerations, and punctures 
(32%); exposure to blood and body 
fluids through needle-sticks; animal 
bites and other mechanisms (25%); 
and chemical exposures (19%) 
(Gosavi et al., 2018). However, some 
lab accidents cause permanent debili-
tating injuries or are fatal (Carson, 
2014; Gibson et al., 2014; Jia, 2016; 
Kemsley, 2016; Van Noorden, 2011).
Investigations into significant 
academic laboratory accidents reveal 
systematic safety failures (ISHN, 
2011; Benderly, 2016b). Within the 
aviation, nuclear, and medical fields, 
there is abundant safety culture re-
search, but less exploration of safety 
culture within higher education 
outside of these fields (Gutierrez et 
al., 2013; NRC, 2014; Schroder et 
al., 2016). While safety culture has 
a variety of definitions (Wiegmann 
et al., 2004), here we define safety 
culture as one in which all individu-
als feel responsible for safety, where 
employees proactively identify un-
safe conditions and behaviors and 
intervene to correct them, and em-
ployers place the intrinsic value of 
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individuals within the organization 
above their monetary significance.  
The small collection of studies on 
academic laboratories reveal weak 
safety cultures (Ayi & Hon, 2018; 
Eldridge, 2012; Gosavi et al., 2018; 
Gutierrez et al., 2013; Van Noorden, 
2011). Of practical significance, 
motivation, accident experience, and 
safety training significantly influ-
enced safety culture and incidents 
(Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Ferjencik 
& Jalovy, 2010; Wu et al., 2007). The 
presence of a safety manager and a 
safety committee also influence safety 
culture (NRC, 2014; Wu et al., 2007). 
Moderating factors included gender, 
age/experience, and title (McEwen 
et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2007). For 
teaching laboratories, student under-
standing of safety can be used as a 
proxy for measuring safety culture 
effectiveness. Studies show students 
in teaching laboratories have deficient 
safety knowledge (Adane & Abejee, 
2012; Al-Shuaili & Al-Muammari, 
2010; Karapantsios et al., 2008). 
This could be addressed by embed-
ding competencies in chemical safety 
information into the undergraduate 
curriculum (Sigmann, 2018).
A proactive safety culture is gener-
ated through a core commitment to 
safety in all levels of an organization 
(NRC, 2014). Safety as a core value 
can be communicated many ways, 
including a nonpunitive reporting 
system and using safety in faculty per-
formance reviews (Benderly, 2016a). 
Recognition of safety performance 
has been noted in safety culture 
surveys to be an area for growth 
(Gutierrez et al., 2013). Challenges 
to an effective safety culture include 
knowledge gaps, the hierarchical 
system in academia, and the unique 
safety considerations of research labs 
compared to educational labs (NRC, 
2014). This is further complicated by 
the difficulty in changing safety be-
havior through interventions (Reniers 
et al., 2014). Figure 1 presents a theo-
retical framework for safety culture. 
It is clear that very serious safety 
concerns exist in academic laborato-
ries. It is also clear that safety culture 
is complex. The purpose of this study 
is to contribute to the small body of 
work in this area by investigating 
safety culture at a research-active 
private university, specifically explor-
ing several metrics of safety culture 
participation and self-efficacy. We 
hypothesized the following:
1. Less than 25% of the potential 
participant pool would respond to 
the survey. 
2. Training has a positive impact 
on faculty self-efficacy regarding 
awareness and use of safety poli-
cies and procedures.
3. Belief that the organization is 
engaged in the safety culture at 
multiple levels has a positive 
impact on faculty self-efficacy 
regarding awareness and use of 
safety policies and procedures.
Material and methods
Data were collected from principal 
investigators (PIs) and laboratory 
supervisors (LSs) employed at a me-
dium-sized, private university. Par-
ticipants were selected using purpo-
sive sampling, targeting those who 
both meet the definition of a chemi-
FIGURE 1
Safety Culture Theoretical Framework
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cal worker and those who have PI or 
LS responsibilities. The institution 
has a Carnegie Classification of R3, 
a “moderate research” institution. 
Research activities at this institution 
garner both internal and external 
funding support.
 Faculty were asked to complete 
a survey on their knowledge and 
perspectives regarding institution-
al safety culture. The survey was 
deemed exempt by the institutional 
review board prior to administration 
of the survey. 
A cross-sectional survey was used, 
developed by faculty across multiple 
disciplines, including those with ex-
pertise in fire safety, chemical safety, 
and science communication. The 
survey tool consisted of 11 closed 
questions. QuestionPro was used to 
administer the surveys anonymously. 
Survey data were collected in spring 
2019. Responses were voluntary. All 
survey data were treated as nominal. 
The number of respondents prevented 




A hallmark of a strong safety cul-
ture is engagement (Nahrgang et al., 
2011). However, as hypothesized, 
our survey was met with a low re-
sponse rate. Of the 52 LSs or PIs 
identified in the sample institution, 
only eight responded to the survey 
device, resulting in a 15% response 
rate and confirming our hypothesis 
that less than 25% of the potential 
participant pool would respond to 
the survey. The lack of participation 
in this study from the potential par-
ticipant pool indicates engagement 
as an important shortcoming of the 
sample institution’s safety culture. 
Even from the outset of the study, 
faculty engagement in lab safety 
culture represented a problematic 
hurdle. As the research team pre-
pared for data collection, it was 
found that the sample institution did 
not have an accurate or complete 
picture of its LS or PI population. No 
definitive list of LSs or PIs existed on 
a university, college, department, or 
program level. Without a definitive 
list of LSs or PIs, this study relied on 
three rounds of distinct solicitation: 
one by distribution of the survey 
devised through an institutional 
full-time faculty listserv; a second 
round distributed through college-
level administrative staff; and a 
third distributed directly to LS and 
PI faculty identified by department 
chairs, program chairs, and other 
department-level administrative 
staff. In total, the research team con-
tacted 42 department and program 
chairs, as well as other administrative 
staff, who collectively identified 52 
faculty members as either LSs or PIs. 
The lack of institutional awareness 
of its critical laboratory personnel 
speaks to a foundational engagement 
problem. Without clear or accurate 
accounting of a lab population, it is 
difficult to engage that population 
in an institutional culture of safety. 
During data collection, the re-
search team also experienced confu-
sion from institutional points of con-
tact about what constituted a “labo-
ratory environment” or “chemical 
workers.” Some contacts questioned 
whether or not their labs qualified 
for participation in the study. Some 
points of contact initially rejected 
our request to distribute the survey 
due to a perceived lack of labora-
tory spaces within that institutional 
division. This confusion about what 
constitutes a lab in which profes-
sionalized safety protocols are re-
quired represents something of an 
unexpected confounding variable in 
this study. The confusion expressed 
by college, department, and program 
contacts suggests there may be 
additional faculty whose labs and 
work qualifies them for participa-
tion in this study, but who were not 
identified or made aware or did not 
self-identify to participate, despite 
the key terms of “laboratory environ-
ment” and “chemical worker” being 
defined in the recruitment messaging. 
This observed confusion speaks to 
the problem of cultural engagement. 
Without accurate accounting of insti-
tutional lab personnel, communica-
tion about what conditions warrant 
professionalized lab safety practices 
is unlikely to disseminate adequately 
throughout that population. Without 
adequate communication of fun-
damental lab safety culture tenants 
and practices, faculty are unlikely to 
become or remain actively engaged 
in a culture of practice.
Training
According to OSHA, a Chemical 
Hygiene Plan (CHP) must address 
specific criteria, including but not 
limited to (1) the criteria an employ-
er will use to determine and imple-
ment hazard control measures, in-
cluding use of personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and hygiene prac-
tices and (2) methods and observa-
tions that may be used to detect the 
presence or release of a hazardous 
chemical, (3) physical and health 
hazards of chemicals in the work 
area, and (4) the measures work-
ers can take to protect themselves 
from these hazards, including the 
use of PPE (OSHA, 2011b). While 
OSHA mandates training on the Lab 
Standard (and thus the CHP) at the 
time of appointment or when du-
ties or hazards change, the institu-
tion studied here has mandated that 
Lab Standard training occur annu-
ally. Five of the eight respondents 
(62.5%) indicated they had been 
trained on the use of PPE in the 
last 12 months. Three respondents 
(37.5%) reported they had not been 
trained on PPE use, with one being 
employed over 12 months and two 
employed less than 12 months.  As 
PIs and LSs, the respondents also 
have been delegated responsibil-
ity through the CHP for selecting 
appropriate PPE for an activity in 
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their work area. The same distribu-
tion was reported for being trained 
on PPE selection, with 62.5% re-
porting adequate training. Despite 
the training deficiencies, all respon-
dents indicated confidence in select-
ing appropriate PPE. 
Two respondents (25%) reported 
being trained on the institution’s 
CHP within the last year, while one 
(12.5%) reported training in the last 
five years. Five faculty (62.5%) 
reported never being trained on the 
CHP, with two being employed for 
more than 12 months. Institutional 
policy mandates initial training with 
annual refresher training, meaning 
37.5% of faculty were noncompli-
ant. Training covered key concepts 
including the digital location of the 
CHP and Safety Data Sheets (SDS), 
the presence of an anonymous safety 
reporting system, the institutional 
hazardous waste (HW) disposal 
procedures, and key points of con-
tact for safety within the institution. 
Respondent knowledge of each was 
explored in the survey (Table 1). 
While only half of the respondents 
had been trained on the CHP, the 
majority knew how to access the 
electronic SDS. The response rate 
was too low to reliably report cor-
relations between receiving training 
and responses on the key aspects of 
training. 
Of substantial concern is the 
lack of knowledge of an established 
procedure for the handling and dis-
posal of hazardous waste. The Re-
source Conservation and Recovery 
Act (40 CFR 262.17[a]) mandates 
that hazardous waste personnel at 
large quantity generators (LQGs) 
are trained, at a minimum, to en-
sure facility personnel are able to 
respond effectively to emergencies 
involving hazardous waste (EPA, 
2016). Failure to meet these training 
requirements can result in civil and 
criminal penalties. Training must 
occur within six months of job 
placement and retraining must occur 
annually. Half of the respondents 
reported training within the last year. 
Another 37.5% reported no training, 
but employment less than 12 months. 
Only one respondent (12.5%) was 
clearly in violation of this training 
mandate, reporting training within 
the last five years. Only 57% of re-
spondents indicated an established 
procedure for handling and disposal 
of hazardous waste. The sample size 
prevented reliable analysis of cor-
relations, however, there are some 
interesting potential relationships. 
While knowledge of HW disposal 
procedures did appear to correlate 
with training, confidence in making 
HW determinations did not appear 
to correlate with training. Similarly, 
there did not appear to be a correla-
tion between those who identified a 
standard procedure for handling HW 
and those who felt confident handling 
HW. The relationship between safety 
training and self-efficacy warrants 
further investigation. 
While this institution has decen-
tralized training, current efforts are 
aimed at centralizing basic training 
through an online training platform 
through the institution’s learning 
management system. Even with 
centralized training, certain topics 
(e.g., procedure-specific standard 
operating procedures [SOPs] and 
advanced engineering controls) will 
require hands-on training led by 
the PI or the LS. Six respondents 
(85.7%) indicated their responsibil-
ity for providing training for specific 
hazards in their work area. Only 
one respondent disagreed with this 
responsibility.
Lab practices
Faculty were asked to consider their 
laboratory practices, facilities, and 
equipment (Table 2). When queried 
about responsibility for inspect-
ing laboratory equipment in their 
work area for safety, most faculty 
responded positively, accepting this 
responsibility. Half of respondents 
reported maintaining a record of 
routine equipment maintenance, 
while only a third reported record-
ing equipment repair. Of concern, 
half of the survey respondents re-
porting using defective equipment 
in their work area. 
According to both the American 
Chemical Society and the National 
Science Teaching Association, com-
munal eyewear should be disinfected 
between uses to reduce transmission 
of diseases such as common head lice 
(Joint Board-Council Committee on 
Chemical Safety & American Chemi-
cal Society, 2009; NSTA, 2017). This 
is further supported in OSHA’s Labo-
ratory Safety Guidance, stating that 
it is important to clean and disinfect 
PPE prior to storage (OSHA, 2011a). 
The institution’s CHP supports this 
action, mandating disinfection be-
tween uses for communal eyewear. 
However, only 16.7% of faculty re-
ported adherence to this policy. 
TABLE 1
Knowledge of key aspects of training.
Agree Disagree
Know the Chemical Hygiene Plan location 42.9% 57.1%
Know how to access Safety Data Sheets 71.4% 28.6%
Knowledge of the Safety Reporting System 57.1% 42.9%
Knowledge of established hazardous waste disposal 
procedures
57.1% 42.9%
Know the safety points of contact within the institution 57.1% 42.9%
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Most faculty accepted responsibil-
ity for performing chemical inventory 
maintenance for chemicals. In regard 
to chemical storage, 66.7% of faculty 
reported storing chemicals by their 
hazard class, which is the appropriate 
method, while 16.7% reported stor-
ing chemicals by frequency of use, 
and another 16.7% reported storing 
chemicals according to the project the 
chemicals were used for. It is possible 
that this level of storage was used as 
the primary method of segregating 
chemicals and that segregation by 
hazards was a secondary level of seg-
regation, but that was not identifiable 
in this survey. Alphabetical storage is 
an antiquated method that no faculty 
reported using.
Facilities and equipment 
A third of faculty surveyed were un-
sure if their work area had appropri-
ate GFI outlets near water sources 
and 16.7% reported a need for GFI 
outlets near water sources in their 
work area. A third of faculty were 
unsure if their work area provided 
adequate equipment storage, another 
third of faculty responded they had 
adequate equipment storage, and 
the final third indicated insufficient 
equipment storage.  
Half of faculty surveyed were 
unsure if the eye protection used 
in their work area was appropriate 
for the hazards present. In OSHA’s 
General Industry Standard (29 CFR 
1910.133), the law states that “the 
employer shall ensure that each af-
fected employee uses appropriate eye 
or face protection…”,  referring to the 
standards set by the American Na-
tional Standards Institute (ANSI) and 
the International Safety Equipment 
Association (OSHA, 2011a). ANSI 
Z87+ protects against high-velocity 
impact, Z87 is low-velocity blunt 
impact, D3 protects against chemical 
splashes, D4 protects against dust, 
and D5 protects against fine dust. 
All eyewear must be marked with its 
category. Products for smaller head 
sizes are marked with the letter “H.” 
The majority of faculty reported 
one or more fire extinguishers, eye-
wash stations, safety showers, and 
chemical spill kits in their work areas. 
Overall, faculty were confident in 
knowing the presence or absence of 
these safety response items, with only 
one respondent indicating “unsure” 
in regard to the presence of a class 
ABC fire extinguisher. It is unclear 
if this respondent was unsure about 
the ABC classification of an existing 
fire extinguisher or unsure about the 
presence of a fire extinguisher. There 
is no explicit requirement for fire 
blankets in laboratories. However, 
NFPA 45 Standard on Fire Protection 
for Laboratories Using Chemicals 
(section 4.6.3.2) does require that 
procedures for extinguishing clothing 
fires are established (NFPA, 2019). 
Fire blankets can be a useful tool in 
such a procedure.
Safety culture
Faculty were surveyed on their 
engagement with the institutional 
safety culture through a variety of 
mechanisms, including communi-
cation, engagement, and percep-
tions of institutional commitment 
to safety. In faculty to institutional 
communication, all respondents 
reported having contacted safety 
personnel within the last year, with 
83% notifying safety personnel of 
existing or potential safety hazards 
and 83% requesting safety-related 
professional development within 
the last year. However, two individ-
uals (33%) did not receive commu-
nication back from the institution as 
a result of this effort. One tactic to 
close this loop is to streamline the 
communication method between 
faculty and the Environmental 
Health and Safety Office. 
A large portion of respondents 
(83%) reported taking an active role 
in preparing safety procedures within 
their own work area, though fewer re-
ported engagement at the department 
or college level (67%). However, at 
the campus or institution level, 83% 
reported involvement in this respon-
sibility. The nature of the involvement 
was not explored. 
Only 17% of respondents felt that 
the institution provided adequate 
resources to ensure safety. The same 
number of respondents also disagreed 
with the statement that the institution 
took action regarding safety issues 
raised by employees. Because a pro-
active safety culture requires a core 
TABLE 2
Faculty perceptions regarding facilities and equipment.
Agree Disagree
Responsible for inspecting equipment for safety 85.7% 14.3%
Responsible for performing chemical inventory maintenance 85.7% 14.3%
GFI outlets present near water sources 33.3% 66.7%
ANSI-coded eye protection 16.7% 83.3%
Adequate exhaust ventilation 33.3% 66.7%
Adequate equipment storage 33.3% 66.7%
≥1 ABC fire extinguisher 66.7% 33.3%
≥1 fire blanket 0% 100% 
≥1 eyewash station 83.3% 16.7%
≥1 safety shower 83.3% 16.7%
≥1 chemical spill kit 66.7% 33.3%
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commitment to safety from all levels, 
feedback must be taken seriously in 
order to address false perceptions 
appropriately and promote open com-
munication. While the sample size 
prevents reporting of a correlation, 
it is interesting that those who indi-
cated they know the point of contact 
in administration regarding safety 
appeared to be more likely to sup-
port the statement that administrators 
take action on safety issues raised by 
employees. This potential correlation 
justifies further investigation in future 
studies.  
Another question that highlighted 
concerns with self-efficacy focused 
on faculty confidence that their 
laboratory practices met federal 
guidelines. Surprisingly, only 17% 
of faculty agreed that their laboratory 
met guidelines, with no respondents 
suggesting they strongly agreed. 
Half of the respondents were unsure 
if they met guidelines while 33% 
strongly disagreed, suggesting they 
are aware that they are not meeting 
federal safety guidelines. It is unclear 
if this understanding was achieved 
through this survey or prior to this 
survey. Question placement could 
have biased this question. The final 
question of the survey suggested 
hope: Eighty-three percent of respon-
dents suggested they would support 
a nonpunitive review of their work 
area for compliance with federal and 
institutional guidelines, with most 
suggesting they strongly agreed 
with this. With this review executed 
through the Environmental Health 
and Safety Office, strong commu-
nication between faculty and safety 
personnel can help develop a safety 
community rather than a confronta-
tional or punitive atmosphere.
Limitations
Nonresponse error is a significant 
limitation of this study. The n of 
eight did not allow us to confidently 
determine if correlation results were 
statistically significant.  We elected 
not to report significance results so 
as not to mislead the reader.  How-
ever, it should be noted that low 
survey response rates may be a 
symptom of a larger issue of orga-
nizations placing too little empha-
sis on safety as a discipline. With a 
limited respondent pool, it was not 
possible to look for correlations be-
tween safety attitudes and disciplin-
ary expertise, industry connections, 
or years of experience. 
 Geographic limitation of this sur-
vey is a limitation. Results may be 
different based on geographical scope. 
Safety may be viewed differently in 
industrial areas of the United States, 
thereby generating different levels of 
survey response and attitudes toward 
safety practice.
 The design of this study did not 
analyze reliability and the results 
were not confirmed with known group 
validity because it is unlikely such 
group validity exists for the sample 
population. This limitation leads 
to low external validity. This study 
provides insight into safety culture 
at the test university, but does not 
necessarily describe safety culture in 
teaching and research laboratories at 
other institutions, even of similar size 
and composition. Future work will 
include multiple universities in order 
to improve external validity. 
Measurement errors may have oc-
curred where survey statistics differ 
from the true value due to the data 
collection methods. Poor question 
wording and a poor understanding of 
survey questions are confounding fac-
tors that are mechanisms for this error. 
Bias is a concern in voluntary self-
response, which may over-represent 
strong opinions. It is unclear how this 
limitation impacted the results. 
Broader implications
Challenges abound, some that mirror 
“No news is good news” or “Do we 
have to report the minor accident?” 
However, this leads to “Tomb Stone 
Safety” where procedures are not 
written and reviewed until after a 
major accident happens (Del Balzo, 
2017). Safety programs, inspections, 
and training cost money and time. 
However, effective policies and 
training prepare faculty, students, 
and/or employees to act in crisis situ-
ations or, preferably, before an acci-
dent occurs. A modern take on safety 
culture applies three tenets: safety is 
an ethical responsibility, people are 
the solution instead of the problem, 
and safety is the presence of positive 
capacities rather than the absence of 
negative events (Dekker, 2014).
Safety is a critical aspect of any 
organizational mission.  The loss of 
life, limb, or function is a huge price 
to pay for not (1) having adequate 
safety measures in place where (2) 
students and faculty know how to 
access them in order to (3) develop 
work behaviors that include ingrained 
awareness and safety practices. 
Students and faculty alike conduct 
experiments and labs that model 
procedures they may encounter out 
of the university setting.  Safety is a 
discipline. It goes beyond common 
sense and should be inculcated at the 
earliest stage of professional develop-
ment. Safety as a discipline requires 
continuous reinforcement for a safety 
culture to flourish. Safety awareness 
and safety attitudes are transferable 
skills. Unfortunately, the world is 
not an inherently safe place.  Safety 
is not a passive activity nor is it the 
absence of accidents. When accidents 
or injuries occur, after-action report-
ing is necessary not only to identify 
what happened, but to prevent similar 
occurrences from happening again. 
The aviation and medical fields 
have taken the lead on root-cause 
analysis and after-action reporting, 
but the importance of well-organized 
safety programs crosses over into 
other industries as well (Del Balzo, 
2017). Safety is a concerted effort by 
organizational leadership and team 
members to minimize mistakes and 
injuries (Lundell & Marcham, 2018).
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Conclusions
A strong safety culture has en-
gaged employees. One of the key 
limitations of this study —the small 
sample size—highlights the con-
cern over lack of engagement. We 
hypothesized that less than 25% of 
the potential participant pool would 
respond to the survey; 15% did. The 
low participation rate in this study 
may be due to attitudes toward safe-
ty and reluctance in reporting safety 
perceptions and behaviors.  
The second hypothesis was that 
training has a positive impact on 
faculty’s belief in their ability to suc-
ceed regarding use of safety policies 
and procedures. While correlations 
in this study have low significance 
due to the low participation rate, 
we can see that there appears to be 
a relationship between training and 
key aspects of training such as the 
location of the CHP, SDS, and safety 
reporting system. Training appears to 
be correlated to knowledge of haz-
ardous waste disposal procedures. 
However, quite interestingly, there 
was not an apparent correlation 
between hazardous waste training 
and confidence in making hazardous 
waste determinations, suggesting 
low self-efficacy in this area. The 
correlation between safety training 
and self-efficacy warrants further 
investigation. 
This study also showed a con-
cerning trend of laboratory activities 
that not only violate institutional 
guidelines and contradict training, 
but also pose safety risks to faculty, 
staff, and students. Faculty reported 
using defective equipment and a low 
rate of disinfection of communal 
eyewear between users. Lab super-
visors have a responsibility to set 
the example and to ensure the safety 
of those working in their labora-
tory. Therefore, all lab supervisors 
should ensure adequate storage for 
equipment, be aware of needed and 
implemented engineering controls 
such as GFI outlets, establish ap-
propriate administrative controls 
(e.g., SOPs), and ensure proper eye 
protection is available for workers. 
Our survey suggests this is an area 
of growth. 
The results of this survey reveal 
that there are gaps in actual engage-
ment of some levels of the safety 
culture (e.g., disconnected commu-
nication) as well as perceived gaps 
in engagement (e.g., perception of 
inadequate safety resources). There 
is promise, though, that faculty re-
port strong engagement in preparing 
safety policies and procedures at all 
levels. While this survey could not 
adequately explore the hypothesis 
that organization engagement with 
safety culture at multiple levels posi-
tively impacts faculty self-efficacy 
regarding safety, this survey does 
provide foundational evidence for 
how to explore this more deeply 
in a future study. Faculty are open 
to nonpunitive review, which may 
have a positive impact on faculty 
self-efficacy. It would be interest-
ing to more deeply explore how the 
connection between a disciplinary 
approach versus a collaborative ap-
proach could influence self-efficacy. 
The literature review suggested 
that there is weak safety culture 
within academic laboratories. The 
research indicates this remains 
problematic to address within higher 
education. Future researchers should 
explore management and employee 
attitudes toward safety to determine 
if these attitudes are a barrier to ef-
fectively reporting safety compliance 
data. Future researchers could also 
compare and contrast safety attitudes 
and behaviors based on moderating 
variables such as age, gender, experi-
ence, title, field of expertise, connec-
tion to industry, and other potential 
moderating variables. ■
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